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Abstract:  Until now, scholars have argued that unlike other Latin American countries with 
sizable indigenous populations, indigenous politics are largely unimportant in Peru because 
indigenous-based parties or national-level movements are absent.  Rather than focusing solely on 
the emergence of indigenous parties or movements, which ignores the larger consequence of 
individuals‘ indigenous identifications for electoral politics, we argue that it is more important to 
examine the emergence of indigenous political divisions and their effects on indigenous 
representation.  Using data from the World Values Survey across the presidential elections of 
1995, 2001, and 2006, we show that as indigenous identity has become more carefully defined, 
indigenous voting divisions have emerged in Peru, and concomitantly, parties have begun to 
recognize and respond to these divisions. 
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On April 17, 2009, the Peruvian daily newspaper El Correo published on its front page a 
picture of congressional representative Hilaria Supa Huamán from Cuzco, the first elected 
politician to take the oath of office in her native language of Quechua in 2006.  The front-page 
picture, however, was not meant to highlight Supa‘s Quechua-speaking roots or her traditional 
indigenous clothing.  Instead, the picture directed attention to the grammatical and 
orthographical mistakes contained in the hand-written notes the self-educated Supa had taken in 
Spanish.  In an editorial, Aldo Mariátegui, the director of the newspaper, criticized the illiteracy 
and lack of legislative professionalism of elected representatives like Supa.  Congressional 
representatives across party lines, several media outlets and other professional organizations 
quickly denounced the overt racial overtones of the newspaper and its director, who ironically is 
the grandson of José Carlos Mariátegui, a well-known indigenous rights advocate. 
While the editorial itself was deplorable, the election of representatives like Supa also 
reveals the changing makeup of Peru‘s political class.  In the congressional elections of 2006, 
Supa became one of seven indigenous congressional representatives, up from one indigenous 
representative in 2001 (Paulina Arpasi).  While mass suffrage was extended during Peru‘s 
democratic transition, including many indigenous voters, the representation of indigenous groups 
by indigenous leaders like Arpasi and Supa constitutes a new political development.  This forces 
us to ask, have ethnic identities become politicized in contemporary Peru, and if so, what 
accounts for this politicization? 
The growing literature on indigenous politics in Latin America has portrayed Peru as an 
exceptional case, noting the absence of robust activism of nationally-organized indigenous 
movements and parties when compared to neighboring and ethnically similar Andean countries 
like Ecuador and Bolivia.  The existing party politics literature focusing on Peru has traditionally 
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dwelt on class divisions to explain partisan choices (Dietz, 1985), including discussion of how 
the growth of the informal sector weakened the partisan manifestation of the class cleavage 
(Cameron, 1994; Roberts, 1996).  Yet the salience of ethnic divisions for party competition 
remains unexplored.  This is not entirely surprising given the widespread consensus on the 
absence of indigenous politics in contemporary Peru (Yashar, 1998).   
While the indigenous politics literature emphasizes the cultural and organizational 
components of indigenous cleavages (Van Cott, 2005; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; on the three 
components of cleavages, see Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 213-20), we argue that the sociological 
component is the most important to explain the emergence of indigenous political representation, 
not just in Peru, but for cases like Bolivia and Ecuador as well.  Previous research has argued 
that the incorporation of indigenous issues in Bolivia and Ecuador was achieved because 
indigenous voters in these countries are culturally distinct from the rest of the population and 
indigenous movements have launched indigenous political parties (Van Cott, 2005).  While some 
literature assumes that indigenous Peruvians are not culturally distinct and do not have 
organizations to mobilize people for indigenous causes, other literature has shown these 
assertions to be false (see, for instance, García and Lucero, 2004).  Indigenous cultural and 
organizational manifestations of the indigenous cleavage have long been present in Latin 
America.  Only recently have indigenous ethnic identities emerged as political identities.  This is 
because two presidential campaigns—those of Alejandro Toledo (2001) and Ollanta Humala 
(2006)—have realized the electoral potential of indigenous voters; recognizing this, both made 
numerous overt attempts to court indigenous voters.  Arguments in the broader ethnic politics 
literature related to material grievances, the institutional setting, and the size of ethnic groups are 
unable to explain why indigenous issues were not represented prior to Toledo. 
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We utilize public opinion data from the World Values Survey across three separate 
presidential elections (1995, 2001, and 2006) to test whether the sociological element of an 
ethnic cleavage—party preferences—has emerged in Peru as a political division.  The results 
show that indigenous identities have become politically salient, and that Toledo‘s campaign 
successfully cultivated a significant electoral base among indigenous voters.  This political 
division remains in 2006 with indigenous support going largely to the parties associated with 
Humala.  These results confirm the increasing salience of indigenous identities that has been 
documented previously in other Latin American countries (Madrid, 2005a, 2005b, 2008), but not 
in Peru. 
The Peruvian Case 
During the 1980s, following the country‘s return to civilian rule, Peruvian party politics 
appeared relatively stable: four major parties—the center-right Popular Action party (AP), the 
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance party (APRA), the leftist United Left (IU) and the 
conservative Popular Christian Party (PPC)—accounted for the bulk of the popular vote (Dietz 
and Myers, 2007: 69; Levitsky, 1999).  These parties ―possessed national structures, discernable 
programs or ideologies, and identifiable social bases‖ (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003: 6).  These 
established parties, however, fell into crisis as a consequence of the economic collapse of the 
1980s and heightened levels of political violence.  The growth of the informal economy, which 
represented more than 50 percent of the economically active population by 1990, further 
weakened class-based organizations and eliminated partisan identities (Cameron, 1994). 
The economic collapse and deteriorating social conditions of the 1980s led to the 
implosion of the party system.  In the 1995 presidential election, which resulted in Fujimori‘s 
second consecutive presidential term, the major political parties of the 1980s (AP, APRA, PPC 
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and IU) collectively accounted for only 10 percent of the popular vote (Dietz and Myers, 2007: 
69).  Fujimori ran for (and won) re-election for a third consecutive term in 2000, but mounting 
evidence of corruption and gross criminality forced him to resign from office in November of 
that same year.  After Fujimori‘s abrupt resignation, Valentín Paniagua was elected President of 
Peru‘s unicameral Congress and appointed as a caretaker President of the country.  Paniagua 
called for new presidential elections to be held in April 2001. 
According to García (2005: 55), the Paniagua government, while short, was a ―crucial 
turning point in Peruvian indigenous politics.‖  Two important developments are worth noting.  
The first one was the creation of the National Truth Commission to investigate the human rights 
abuses that took place during the country‘s insurgency war.  The Commission‘s work helped to 
bring to light the plight of indigenous people through hundreds of televised testimonies.  Conflict 
with the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) left a death toll of more than 69,000 people among 
civilians, armed forces and insurgent militants; about two-thirds of the people who were killed or 
disappeared spoke Quechua, one of the country‘s most widely spoken indigenous languages 
(Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003).  The second important development was the 
creation of national spaces of dialogue and negotiation between the government and a number of 
indigenous organizations, such as AIDESEP (Inter-Ethnic Development Association of the 
Peruvian Jungle) and CONAP (Confederation of Nationalities of the Peruvian Amazon).
1
  
Compared to previous governments, Paniagua demonstrated greater interest in promoting 
indigenous issues. 
Following the transitional Paniagua government, Alejandro Toledo was elected the 
country‘s first popularly elected president of Andean roots in 2001.  Toledo had run previously 
for the presidency in 1995 under the party label País Posible, and again in 2000 with his current 
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party label Perú Posible.  Toledo frequently used indigenous symbols and discussed issues of 
concern to indigenous voters during his presidential campaign.  In 2000, for instance, he led a 
major protest in opposition to Fujimori‘s third presidential term, calling it ―la marcha de los 
cuatro suyos‖ (the march of the four suyos, or the march of the four corners of the Incan empire).  
During a widely-publicized campaign stop, Toledo‘s wife—Eliane Karp, who speaks fluent 
Quechua—invoked Incan deities known as apus on behalf of her husband, and suggested that 
Toledo represented the reincarnation of the Inca Pachacuti.  President Toledo subsequently 
inaugurated his term in a ceremony at the ruins of Machu Picchu, and there signed the 
Declaration of Machu Picchu in support of indigenous rights.  Toledo often used the term 
―cholo‖—which is often used to describe dark-skinned individuals, including those of indigenous 
decent, and still regarded as an insult by most Peruvians (García, 2005: 28)—to draw attention to 
his Andean origins.   
Despite Toledo‘s campaign rhetoric, his government failed to address the plight of 
indigenous groups, particularly regarding environmental damage to indigenous habitat (Greene, 
2006) and the dislocations that resulted from the concessions given to mining and logging 
companies.  Fujimori‘s economic liberalization program had made mining investment a very 
attractive industry: mining claims by extractive companies skyrocketed from 4 million to 25 
million hectares during the early 1990s (García, 2005: 58), and eleven of the world‘s top twenty 
mining corporations now have operations in Peru (Bury, 2002: 6).  Because mining is 
concentrated in the highlands where many indigenous Peruvians reside, this industry has had 
considerable impact on the rural population, where poverty is endemic (Loker, 1999; 
Korzeniewicz, 2000; López and della Maggiora, 2000).  Due to the negative environmental 
effects associated with mining, transnational mining companies operating in Peru‘s highlands 
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have repeatedly come under siege by rural, national, and transnational protesters, constituting the 
most common type of social conflict in Peru today (Arce, 2008: 52-55). 
García (2005: 28) has suggested that the political spaces that were initially created by the 
Paniagua government to dialogue with indigenous people became increasingly politicized under 
Toledo.  For instance, Eliane Karp took a leading role in indigenous affairs by making them part 
of her official duties as first lady, becoming the president of CONAPA (National Commission 
for Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples)—a governmental organization created to 
support indigenous initiatives.  According to some indigenous activists, the creation of CONAPA 
represented a loss of autonomy; other critics referred to CONAPA as simply ―Comisión Karp‖ 
because the commission came to revolve largely around her.  While not always successful, the 
Toledo government continued the dialogue between government and indigenous people beyond 
Paniagua, and these indigenous initiatives often became front-page newspaper material.  Toledo 
also continued the work of the National Truth Commission (renamed as National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission), which ―sparked new debates over indigenous rights, reparations, 
state accountability, and impunity‖ (García, 2005: 36). 
 Following Toledo, APRA‘s Alan García was reelected in July of 2006.  Interestingly, the 
run-off of the 2006 elections pitted García, the president mostly responsible for the economic 
collapse and heightened insurgent violence of the 1980s, against Ollanta Humala, a nationalist 
and founder of the Partido Nacionalista del Perú (PNP).  Espousing anti-globalization policies, 
Humala pledged to revoke the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, and ―squeeze‖ 
multinational mining corporations that have received ―sweetheart contracts‖ from the Peruvian 
government (Forero, 2006).  Humala‘s father (Isaac) was the founder of the ultranationalist 
movement known as ―Etnocacerismo‖ (Ethnocacerist Movement).  This movement seeks to 
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restore the Incan heritage of Peru, reasserting the role of marginalized indigenous masses in 
contemporary Peruvian society.  Similar to Toledo, Humala made use of ethnic appeals during 
his campaign, and also vowed to stop the eradication of coca, following in the steps of Bolivia‘s 
Evo Morales.  During the campaign, Humala was quoted as saying in the print media that ―he 
could not allow indigenous people be left without an answer to neoliberalism.‖2  While Humala‘s 
presidential bid was unsuccessful, his party‘s last minute alliance with the movement Unión por 
el Perú (UPP)
3
 together won more seats (45 out of 120) than any other party in Congress, 
electing seven indigenous representatives. 
The Politicization of Indigenous Identities 
Much work in comparative politics has examined issues of ethnicity and party politics.  
Regarding the conditions under which indigenous identities (and ethnicity more generally) 
become politicized, some contend that ethnic conflicts—and the emergence of ethnic identities 
and the parties that represent them—are rooted in material grievances (see, for instance, Chua, 
2003; for a comprehensive review, see Horowitz, 1985: 105-135).  A long line of research 
suggests that permissive electoral systems (as well as other institutions) allow ethnic parties to 
emerge (see, for instance, Horowitz, 1985; Van Cott, 2003; Rice and Van Cott, 2006), while 
others stress that the size of the ethnic group matters as well (Posner, 2004; Madrid, 2005b).  
However, defining what constitutes an ethnic party is fraught with problems (Chandra, 
forthcoming).  Additionally, by focusing solely on the emergence of explicitly indigenous 
political parties, recent scholarship on the emergence of ethnic politics in Latin America may be 
ignoring significant indigenous political expressions among voters. 
Contrary to previous literature, we argue that indigenous political identities have formed 
in Peru despite the absence of an explicitly ―indigenous‖ party.  We argue that it is more 
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important to explain the emergence of indigenous political identities, whether represented by 
indigenous-based parties or as part of a multi-ethnic coalition.  Although the examination of one 
country cannot resolve the major debates within this literature (including those not mentioned 
here), the case of Peru sheds some light onto these more prominent arguments.  In particular, 
while some approaches to the study of ethnic politics are helpful in explaining the emergence of 
indigenous politics in Peru (grievance and ethnic group size explanations), and others are less 
helpful (institutional explanations), all are insufficient.  While Peru has possessed many of the 
features highlighted by the literature as necessary for the emergence of ethnic political issues and 
parties for some time, the representation of indigenous issues by political parties constitutes a 
recent development.  For this reason, we rely on arguments that stress the actions of political 
parties in creating and maintaining political identities among voters.  
In terms of institutional explanations, the literature has focused on a few general themes.  
One regards electoral volatility and party fragmentation, which are viewed by some as the first 
signs of the potential incorporation of indigenous groups into the party system (Madrid, 2005b; 
Rice and Van Cott, 2006; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007).  Other literature has argued that higher 
district magnitudes increase the likelihood of indigenous party success (Van Cott, 2003; Rice and 
Van Cott, 2006; see also Horowitz, 1985).  Finally, Van Cott (2003) has also argued that other 
institutional barriers—like difficulties in gaining ballot access and centralized government—
hamper indigenous representation.   
The Peruvian case provides mixed support for these institutional arguments.  For 
instance, recent developments in Peruvian party politics uphold arguments regarding electoral 
volatility and party fragmentation.  As noted above, the Peruvian party system of the 1980s came 
unglued with Fujimori‘s rise to power.  Since then, the party system has been characterized by 
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high volatility and increased fragmentation as indigenous issues have been gradually 
incorporated into the political process (Dietz and Myers, 2007; Cameron, 2009; Vera Delgado 
and Zwarteveen, 2008).  However, party fragmentation and volatility have been a feature of 
Peruvian party politics since Fujimori's rise to power in 1990, and therefore cannot explain why 
indigenous issues were not represented by parties until Toledo.  Arguments relating to district 
magnitude are also unsatisfactory because indigenous political identities did not begin to 
manifest themselves until the 2001 election.  Since 1985, Peru has elected members of Congress 
using one form of proportional representation or another.  Since 2001, the number of districts has 
increased to 26, thereby reducing district magnitude during the period in which indigenous 
identities became salient.  Moreover, both of the additional explanations provided by Van Cott 
(2003) are equally unsatisfactory.  The emergence of an indigenous cleavage has emerged in 
spite of its centralized political system (Peru started a process of decentralization, but only after 
the 2001 elections), as well as a 1997 law designed to tighten ballot access that requires parties to 
collect the signatures of at least four percent of the population.   
Explanations rooted in the sizes of ethnic groups and their material grievances appear 
somewhat more relevant to the Peruvian case.  According to grievance-based accounts of ethnic 
identification, ethnic identities matter for party politics when such identities become socially 
and/or economically marginalized (Chua, 2003; Horowitz, 1985).  That indigenous Peruvians are 
economically marginalized—as predicted by grievance explanations—is supported by recent 
work demonstrating ties between indigenous identity and economic marginalization (Loker, 
1999; Montoya, 1989; Crabtree, 2002; Korzeniewicz, 2000; López and della Maggiora, 2000).  
In the 2006 World Values Survey, Peruvians who self-identified as Quechua, Aymara, or 
Amazonian had lower reported incomes than respondents of other ethnic identities.
4
  Morales 
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(2008) demonstrates that when indigenous groups are economically marginalized, indigenous 
identification negatively impacts individuals' levels of national identification; this, in turn, 
provides the foundation for political divisions along ethnic lines.  Moreover, one would expect 
that economic inequality among indigenous Peruvians could produce social identities that would 
translate into an identifiable political division; recent evidence showing that Peruvians speaking 
indigenous languages have lower levels of national identification suggests this is the case 
(Carrión, Zárate, and Seligson, 2006).  However, while indigenous identities are marginalized 
identities, little evidence exists demonstrating that indigenous Peruvians are more marginalized 
today than in decades past.  Thus, while Toledo, then Humala discussed issues of social and 
economic marginalization, the incorporation of indigenous issues into Peruvian party politics is 
not due to intensifying material grievances. 
Regarding arguments related to the size of ethnic groups, some authors contend that only 
those ethnic groups that are sizable enough in number are represented by political parties 
(Posner, 2004; Madrid, 2005b).  According to this argument, Peru appears to be an anomaly 
when viewed in comparative perspective.  Countries like Bolivia and Ecuador—with indigenous 
populations of 62 and 25 percent, respectively (Wessendorf, 2008)—are often touted as 
examples of robust indigenous politics.  By comparison, Peru's indigenous population, 
comprising 33 percent of the total population (according to the 1993 census; see Wessendorf, 
2008), seems to contradict arguments related to ethnic group size.  Despite Peru's comparatively 
large indigenous population, indigenous Peruvians have long been cautious to identify as such, 
often preferring the less marginalized "Mestizo" identity, which allows them to remove the 
stigmas attached to their culture and practices without abandoning these traditions (de la Cadena, 
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2000).  Indigenous identification has been hampered further by frequent rural migration that has 
dislocated people and disrupted cultural practices (Degregori, 1998).   
While there have always been indigenous Peruvians, they are just now beginning to 
identify as such, and as a result, the political parties are just now beginning to perceive 
indigenous voters as an electoral bloc that is sizable enough to be represented.  Contrary to de la 
Cadena (2000), García and Lucero (2004) contend that indigenous identity is not subsumed 
under Mestizo identity.  They argue that ―Indianness‖ has emerged recently in opposition to 
Mestizo identity, being set in motion by a number of factors: indigenous Peruvians‘ 
disappointment with the policies of the Toledo government; conflicts between indigenous groups 
and the central government over the use of indigenous lands (see also Vera Delgado and 
Zwarteveen, 2008; Bebbington, 2007, 2009; Aiello, 2009; Scurrah, 2008; De Echave, 2009; 
Wessendorf, 2008); financial, logistic, and moral support by the United Nations and several non-
governmental organizations promoting indigenous causes internationally (Greene, 2006); and 
political liberalization, with a livelier and freer press following the end of the Fujimori regime.  
Although unorganized at the national level and not as powerful politically as in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, indigenous activists in Peru have become more organized and politically active in 
recent years; as a result of these activities, they have brought indigenous issues to the attention of 
the political parties.  All of these processes have served to increase indigenous identification, 
which in turn makes indigenous voters as a group sizable enough for representation by political 
parties.  This discussion explains why explicit indigenous identification has increased in recent 
years; however, it cannot explain why the third of Peruvians classified as indigenous (according 
to the 1993 census) were ignored as an electoral bloc, and indigenous issues were not represented 
by the political parties, until the election of Toledo in 2001. 
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While grievance and ethnic group size arguments appear somewhat more useful than 
institutional arguments regarding the emergence of indigenous issues in Peruvian politics, all 
three are insufficient as explanations for why indigenous issues have emerged only recently.  A 
more compelling explanation—and the one that we put forth here—is that indigenous political 
identities in Peru have surfaced only recently because political actors did not target these voters 
as a bloc prior to Toledo‘s 2001 campaign.  Politicians recognizing the distinctiveness of 
indigenous identities have also recognized the electoral potential that the support of these voters 
offers.  As a result, political parties target these voters as a cohesive electoral base of support by 
claiming to represent indigenous interests, and as a result, indigenous voters respond with their 
support.   
Like other arguments associating the formation and maintenance of political identities to 
political actors (Schattschneider, 1960; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; 
Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), the missing 
sociological aspect of the indigenous cleavage (political identities) in Peru has been created and 
activated by political parties in an effort to establish their electoral bases.  This was first achieved 
by Toledo in 2001, who articulated issues and policies favorable to indigenous voters while 
making specific overtures and references to indigenous culture in order to capitalize on the 
political potential they offered.  Humala continued this campaign strategy in 2006.  Although 
subtle, these symbolic campaign messages provide important cues to voters about the issues 
candidates will represent (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Popkin, 1991; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998).  The use of such symbolism is important to any candidate wishing to win 
over indigenous voters, particularly in low-information settings like Peru with its high party 
volatility.  While indigenous issues were not the centerpieces of either candidate's campaign, the 
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fact that both candidates expended considerable effort to attract indigenous voters by referencing 
indigenous symbols and promising to address indigenous voters' concerns demonstrates that 
indigenous issues have become important to party politics in Peru.  This is a particularly 
noteworthy development in a Latin American country like Peru, where scholars have long noted 
that parties were unwilling to campaign along identity-based lines, and therefore cleavages of all 
sorts among voters were often weak (see, for instance, Dix, 1989).   
Although the organization of many parties in Peru and Latin America is often 
personalistic and/or elite-driven, possessing weak organizational tools with which to mobilize 
voters along identity-based lines, there is still reason to expect that campaign appeals to voters 
are enough to create political divisions in the electorate.  The decline of the mass-based party 
model in Europe and the United States since the mid-twentieth century—leading to fewer, more 
professional party members geared toward competing in elections (Aldrich, 1995; Katz and 
Mair, 1992)—has not led to a wholesale dealignment of cleavage-based politics (see, for instance 
Elff [2007], Raymond [2011], and the works cited therein).  Similarly, we do not expect that the 
admittedly weaker organization of indigenous groups in Peru (when compared to Bolivia and 
Ecuador) prevents the formation of political identities among indigenous voters. 
The incorporation of indigenous issues into Peruvian party politics was likely aided by 
economic liberalization under Fujimori.  As has been the case in other countries (Rice and Van 
Cott, 2006: 721), economic liberalization weakened the ties between class identities and the 
political parties, thereby creating the necessary political opening for indigenous issues to come to 
the attention of the parties.  Similar to Yashar (1998)—though not complete at the time of her 
writing—economic liberalization under Fujimori weakened the state institutions that fostered the 
sorts of group-based class rights that previously inhibited explicitly indigenous mobilization.  
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This, in turn, weakened ties between class and the parties of the left, thereby opening the 
necessary political space for the incorporation of indigenous issues.  As a standalone argument, 
however, economic liberalization cannot explain the emergence of indigenous representation 
because parties did not cater to indigenous issues until Toledo's campaign in 2000, 10 years after 
the neoliberal reforms known as "Fujishock."  Instead, the representation of indigenous issues 
appears to have been the result of parties‘ efforts to create indigenous political identities, and 
only supported by economic liberalization. 
In sum, the case of Peru seems to defy the expectations of much of the literature 
regarding the emergence of ethnic group representation.  Arguments relating to institutions, 
material grievances, and ethnic group size were all found to be deficient in some way when 
examined against the Peruvian case.  Instead, we argue that what explains the incorporation of 
indigenous issues in Peruvian party politics are the actions of political parties, which did not 
create the political identities needed for an indigenous cleavage in Peru until Toledo's campaign 
in 2000.  Thus, Peru appears to have been an anomaly when compared with other Latin 
American countries, not because of the absence of an explicitly indigenous party, but because of 
the absence of party actors seeking the support of indigenous voters as a distinctive bloc. 
Data and Methods 
 The data in our research come from the World Values Survey corresponding with the 
years 1996, 2001, and 2006—which closely mirror the presidential elections of 1995, 2001, and 
2006, respectively.  Our dependent variable is a measure of respondents‘ first-party preferences, 
which allows us to measure individuals‘ likely vote choices.5  We examine several of the major 
parties in each of the three time periods, plus those respondents indicating that they would not 
vote.
6
  However, we focus primarily on the party of Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible) in 2001 
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and the parties associated with Ollanta Humala (PNP and UPP) in 2006.  The list of parties is 
given in Table 1.  To give us greater confidence in the results pointing to indigenous identity 
effects, we ran regressions for the 2001 and 2006 data.  We use a binary logistic regression 
model for the 2001 data, coding the dependent variable as one for Toledo's Perú Posible, and 
zero for all other parties.  This is because 45 percent of respondents reported support for Toledo, 
while no other party received support from even 10 percent of respondents.
7
  We use a 
multinomial coding of the dependent variable in the 2006 data in order to compare the parties 
associated with Humala (both as one value, as well as separate values) to APRA, the party 
winning the presidency in 2006 (which we use as the base category), apart from the other major 
parties competing in that election.  Because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable 
with the 2006 data, we use multinomial logistic regression with Clarify 2.0 (King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg, 2000) to estimate predicted probabilities.   
The independent variables of interest in this analysis measure indigenous identities 
(coded one) relative to all other ethnic groups (coded zero).  Measuring ethnicity changed from 
year-to-year: in the 1996 data, indigenous refers only to those who identified as ―Indian.‖  In 
2001, only Amazonians are considered indigenous due to data availability; in addition to 
Amazonians, in 2006 we include Quechua and Aymara identifiers.  The results using 
disaggregated measures of indigenous identity in 2006 produce similar results.
8
  To show the 
effects of indigenous identity further, we also test models with a measure of Mestizo identity
9
 
instead of indigenous identity in order to show the differences between the two.   
 The effects of several other social identities are controlled.  Three controls for class and 
status are included.  The first is a measure of income, ranging from one (lowest) to 10 (highest 
income).  Second, we control for union members who are coded as one, and zero otherwise.  
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Third, we include a measure of education, with those respondents attaining a university degree or 
higher coded as one, and zero otherwise.  Controls for gender (females coded as one, males as 
zero), respondent age, and respondents‘ self-placements along a left-right ideology scale ranging 
from one (left) to 10 (right) are also included.   
Analysis 
Table 1 presents contingency tables displaying party preferences among indigenous and 
Mestizo voters across the three elections.  In the interests of space, the third ethnic category (all 
non-indigenous, non-Mestizos) is excluded for each election.  Looking at indigenous voters in 
1996, no one party receives extraordinarily more support from indigenous voters than the 
majority ethnic group, Mestizos.  In fact, for most parties, the percentage of support coming from 
indigenous voters is roughly equivalent to the support they draw from Mestizos.  While 
Fujimori's Cambio 90 receives the largest percentage of the indigenous vote by far, it is because 
he fared almost equally well among Mestizo voters.  It is worth noting that Alejandro Toledo's 
País Posible fared much better, proportionally, among indigenous than Mestizo voters; this 
relationship is insignificant, however, due in large part to the small number of indigenous 
Peruvians in the sample as well as Toledo's low levels of support.   
Table 1 about here  
In 2001 and 2006, however, the data show that indigenous identity becomes significantly 
associated with party preference.  Toledo's Perú Posible was the main beneficiary of this in 
2001, while PNP and UPP (the parties associated with Humala) are the disproportionate 
beneficiaries in 2006.  These data suggest that 2001 may have been a turning point in Peruvian 
politics, especially for indigenous politics (similar to García, 2005: 55).  With the candidacy of 
Toledo we see that an indigenous political division has formed in Peru.  While indigenous voters 
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comprised only 8.3 percent of respondents in 2001, the fact that Toledo received 
disproportionate support from indigenous voters relative to the other parties suggests that his 
indigenous campaign appeals were effective in winning their support.  Although indigenous 
voters comprised only about 10 percent of his total support, compared with over 53 percent 
coming from Mestizos, the fact remains that Toledo won this group overwhelmingly.  
Additionally, because Toledo also fared disproportionally well among Mestizo voters, his 
coalition of support appears broad-based, drawing majority support from the majority ethnic 
group, yet faring well among indigenous voters as well.   
 The appearance of indigenous political identities persists into 2006.  While no party 
receives a substantial plurality of indigenous support, it is worth noting that the two parties 
affiliated with Humala (PNP and UPP) receive a majority of their support (51 percent) from 
indigenous voters, while the bulk of the remainder appears to come from Mestizo voters (44 
percent).  The fact that their support is drawn from these two groups almost exclusively is in 
keeping with their populist messages.  In comparison, APRA's indigenous support is 
significantly lower.   
To determine the robustness of these findings, we turn to the regression analyses.  Table 
2 presents the results using the 2001 data.  Here, both indigenous and Mestizo respondents were 
more likely to be Toledo supporters, but only indigenous voters were statistically significant 
supporters of Perú Posible.  Holding the control variables at their means (modes in the case of 
nominal variables), Mestizo respondents were about five percent more likely to support Toledo‘s 
Perú Posible party than non-Mestizos. Indigenous respondents were nearly 12 percent more 
likely to say that they support Perú Posible in 2001 than non-indigenous voters, with all other 
variables held to the same values as above. 
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Table 2 about here 
 A more convincing test for whether ethnic identities have been politicized would be to 
see if indigenous voters still concentrate their support for a particular party (or parties) even in 
the absence of Toledo as a candidate, who did not stand for re-election in 2006.  If indigenous 
identities have become politicized, then we should find evidence that the parties have picked up 
where Toledo left off by targeting indigenous support.  In lieu of presenting parameter 
estimates—which showed significant indigenous ethnicity effects in the expected direction—
Figures 1-3 display the predicted probabilities of supporting PNP, UPP, the two parties 
collectively, and APRA where noted.  The parameter estimates can be found in the 
supplementary file.  Turning to the results displayed in Figure 1, the data show that when holding 
all variables at their means (modes in the case of binary variables), support for PNP and UPP is 
substantially higher among indigenous than Mestizo voters.  Additionally, support for APRA is 
considerably lower among indigenous voters than among Mestizo voters.  This indicates that 
indigenous political identities have persisted beyond the 2001 election.  The same can be said 
with regard to support for APRA: while there is little difference between female indigenous and 
Mestizo voters, there is a 5.1 percent difference between indigenous and Mestizo males.  
Furthermore, there is a significant gender gap in support for Humala: the probability of 
indigenous support among males is over 28 percent, and only about 19 percent among females.  
Despite this gender gap, support for Humala is higher among indigenous than non-indigenous 
respondents, both male and female. 
Figure 1 about here 
 Turning now to whether the party support found in Figure 1 is rooted in leftist populism 
(as the comparative implications in Madrid [2005b] imply), the results in Figure 2 suggest that 
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support for PNP/UPP reflects Humala's populist rhetoric.  Poorer voters to the left of center (one 
standard deviation below both the means for income and left-right ideology) have predicted 
probabilities of PNP/UPP support that are much higher than wealthier, rightist voters (one 
standard deviation above both means).  While these differences seem striking, looking at the 
confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities shows that the probabilities one standard 
deviation above and below the mean of income and left-right ideology are not significantly 
different from the probabilities when these variables are set at their means.
10
  Additionally, the 
predicted probabilities for both females and males remain higher for indigenous than Mestizo 
voters.  Taken together, these findings show an indigenous identity effect that is independent of 
class and ideology. 
Figure 2 about here 
 The analysis now turns to differences between the two parties affiliated with Humala.  
Because the PNP/UPP alliance occurred so late in the election campaign (see footnote 3), and 
because until then PNP was the party most affiliated with Humala's left-wing populist message, 
there should be sizable differences between support for PNP and UPP, particularly among 
indigenous voters.  Figure 3 bears this point out: support for PNP is substantially higher than 
support for UPP.  The predicted probabilities for UPP among male voters do not fall within the 
lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the predicted probabilities of PNP support; 
the same result nearly obtains among female voters, too.  Although Mestizo voters were 
significantly less likely to support PNP than indigenous voters,
11
 the same pattern emerges.   
Figure 3 about here 
 Viewing the findings presented above collectively, the fact that we find evidence of 
significant indigenous identity effects across two elections in which a different party catered to 
 20 
indigenous voters in each election suggests that indigenous political divisions may continue to 
remain a prominent feature in Peruvian politics.  Consistent with the argument presented here 
regarding the formation of cleavages by political parties—and consistent with similar arguments 
made elsewhere (Schattschneider, 1960; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; 
Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990)—the reason indigenous 
Peruvians voted as a bloc in these two elections is because both Toledo and Humala made 
electoral appeals to indigenous voters.  Despite the tremendous party volatility between these 
two elections, indigenous identities remained activated, and thus we find evidence of indigenous 
political divisions in both elections.  Were it not for these two parties' appeals to indigenous 
voters, this voting bloc would not have surfaced, and therefore Peru would continue to appear to 
be the outlier case in relation to its neighbors in terms of indigenous politics. 
 As of this writing, the 2011 elections show that indigenous identities remain a significant 
factor in several parties' electoral strategies.  For one thing, Toledo and Humala are leading the 
presidential opinion polls.
12
  Other candidates taking up indigenous issues have also sought to 
enter the race.  This includes Alberto Pizango, the Amazonian tribal leader who led the protests 
at Bagua in 2009, and current president of AIDESEP; and Miguel Hilario, a leader of Amazonian 
Shipibo-Conibo indigenous people, and former president of CONAPA.  And while neither 
Pizango nor Hilario successfully entered the electoral contest, several parties including APRA, 
Solidaridad Nacional, and the Partido Fonavista del Perú, have sought to create alliances with 
these candidates and their organizations.
13
  In sum, several parties have realized the electoral 
potential of the indigenous vote, and indigenous issues appear to remain prominent in Peruvian 
politics as a result. 
Conclusion 
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 Contrary to previous arguments (Yashar, 1998), yet in keeping with the findings from 
other Latin American countries (Madrid, 2005b; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; Birnir and Van Cott, 
2007), this paper demonstrates that Peru is not an exceptional case with regard to indigenous 
politics, especially if one focuses on the emergence of the indigenous political identities and not 
indigenous parties.  Beginning with the successful campaign of former President Toledo and 
continuing with Humala's 2006 presidential campaign, indigenous voters have formed political 
identities.  Because indigenous social movement activity remains robust and because politicians 
continue to acknowledge indigenous voters' concerns, we expect that politicians will continue to 
articulate indigenous interests and attract their support as a result in future elections. 
Additionally, and more importantly, we have contributed to the existing body of theory 
regarding the emergence of indigenous cleavages in Latin America.  While previous studies have 
focused on the emergence of indigenous-based parties, we have shown that by focusing on how 
party actors can activate indigenous political identities, the Peruvian exceptionalism noted in 
previous literature is understandable.  The reason previous scholarship has not found evidence of 
indigenous-based party politics in Peru is because until recently, party actors did not target 
indigenous voters as a distinctive bloc.  Only recently have political parties in Peru forged 
political identities among indigenous voters as parties have done elsewhere.  This is due in part 
because indigenous identification has intensified and become more widespread as indigenous 
social movements have become more active (García and Lucero, 2004), and to economic 
liberalization, which weakened the ties between parties and class identities (Rice and Van Cott, 
2006).  Much like the experience of Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous voters have been targeted 
recently by party actors recognizing indigenous voters‘ cultural distinctiveness, protest 
organizational structures, and socioeconomic marginalization.  While arguments relating to 
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institutions, material grievances, and the size of ethnic groups were found to aid the 
representation of indigenous issues by political parties, none of these arguments explain why 
indigenous issues were not represented prior to Toledo. 
These findings suggest that the missing element to the formation of an indigenous 
cleavage in Peruvian politics has been the absence of political identities, which were not created 
until 2001 with the campaign of Alejandro Toledo.  As the results of this study confirm the 
findings of previous research demonstrating the importance of political actors to the formation of 
political identities cross-nationally (Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; Evans, 
Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), the actions of parties in 
creating these political identities appear paramount to explaining the presence or (apparent) 
absence of indigenous political representation, not just in Peru, but in every other case of ethnic 
political competition.  Future research, therefore, should lend more weight to explanations of the 
emergence of indigenous politics that are based on the emergence of political identities.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1 Indigenous and Mestizo Party Preferences in Three Elections 
 
 1996 2001 2006 
Parties Indigenous Mestizo  Indigenous Mestizo  Indigenous Mestizo  
Toledo
1
  8.00% 
 
2.65% 
 
59.02% 
 
48.05% 
 
- - 
Humala
2
  - - - - 24.81% 
 
10.78% 
 
Cambio 90
3
  40.00 
 
37.40 
 
- - - - 
APRA 2.00 
 
3.57 
 
13.11 
 
14.75 
 
15.44 
 
17.46 
 
Other Parties 22.00 
 
18.41 
 
14.75 
 
29.00 
 
28.86 
 
38.51 
 
Blank/Would 
Not Vote
4
  
28.00 
 
37.97 
 
13.11 
 
8.20 
 
30.89 
 
33.25 
 
Likelihood 
Ratio (df) 
8.60† 
(8) 
33.85* 
(6) 
55.80* 
(6) 
Total 
Indigenous
5
  
4.13% 8.13% 31.25% 
Total 
Mestizo
6
  
71.76% 52.83% 59.07% 
† not significant. * p < .001.  Cell entries are the percentages of the ethnic group supporting that party.   
1 País Posible (1996) and Perú Posible (2001). 
2 Partido Nacionalista del Perú and Unión por el Perú. 
3 Alberto Fujimori's party. 
4 Includes respondents answering "don't know" in 1996. 
5 This is the total percentage of the sample identifying as indigenous. 
6 This is the total percentage of the sample identifying as Mestizo. 
 
 
 29 
 
 
Table 2 Estimates of Party Preferences for Perú Posible (Toledo's Party in 2001) 
 
Model 1 2 
Indigenous .488** 
(.215) 
 
Mestizo  .188 
(.117) 
Left-Right .061** 
(.025) 
.072*** 
(.025) 
Income -.142*** 
(.035) 
-.140*** 
(.035) 
Union Member .446 
(.285) 
.479* 
(.282) 
University Educated .042 
(.158) 
.046 
(.158) 
Women .032 
(.114) 
.035 
(.114) 
Age .012*** 
(.004) 
.011** 
(.004) 
Constant -.539** 
(.242) 
-.647** 
(.258) 
LR Chi-Square (df) 46.22 (7) 43.56 (7) 
Pseudo R
2
 .026 .024 
n  1299 1299 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Supplementary Material 
 
 The tables in this supplementary file correspond with Figures 1 through 3 in the main 
text.  Tables 3 and 4 correspond with the predicted probabilities displayed in Figures 1 and 2.  
The alternative five-category measurement of the dependent variable in Tables 5 and 6 
correspond with the predicted probabilities presented in Figure 3.  
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Table 3 Estimates of Party Preferences (2006) 
 
 PNP
1
 / UPP
2
 Other Parties Would not Vote 
 
Indigenous
3
  1.111*** 
(.247) 
.180 
(.223) 
.260 
(.230) 
Left-Right -.124** 
(.048) 
-.021 
(.040) 
-.115*** 
(.042) 
Income -.127 
(.080) 
.103* 
(.059) 
.020 
(.063) 
Union Member .382 
(.406) 
.094 
(.362) 
-.246 
(.395) 
University Educated .070 
(.391) 
.237 
(.296) 
.149 
(.315) 
Women -.117 
(.234) 
.652*** 
(.188) 
.397** 
(.197) 
Age -.001 
(.008) 
-.00004 
(.00653) 
.005 
(.007) 
Constant -.509 
(.507) 
.108 
(.424) 
.580 
(.436) 
LR Chi-Square (df) 94.79 (21) 
Pseudo R
2
 .037 
n  975 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano). 
1 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP). 
2 Unión por el Perú. 
3 Indigenous here refers to Quechua, Aymara, and Amazonian respondents. 
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Table 4 Estimates of Party Preferences (2006) 
 
 PNP
1
 / UPP
2
 Other Parties Would not Vote 
 
Mestizo
3
  -.557** 
(.228) 
.216 
(.195) 
.081 
(.202) 
Left-Right -.125*** 
(.047) 
-.023 
(.040) 
-.117*** 
(.042) 
Income -.179** 
(.078) 
.080 
(.058) 
-.001 
(.062) 
Union Member .500 
(.401) 
.158 
(.362) 
-.188 
(.394) 
University Educated .105 
(.388) 
.242 
(.296) 
.155 
(.315) 
Women -.138 
(.232) 
.640*** 
(.188) 
.386** 
(.196) 
Age -.003 
(.008) 
-.001 
(.007) 
.005 
(.007) 
Constant 1.414*** 
(.474) 
.123 
(.412) 
.698* 
(.422) 
LR Chi-Square (df) 83.43 (21) 
Pseudo R
2
 .032 
n  975 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano). 
1 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP). 
2 Unión por el Perú. 
3 Mestizo refers to "Mulatto" category in the World Values Survey data. 
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Table 5 Estimates of Party Preferences (2006) 
 
 UPP
1
  PNP
2
 Other Parties Would not Vote 
 
Indigenous
3
  1.009*** 
(.360) 
1.155*** 
(.270) 
.180 
(.223) 
.261 
(.230) 
Left-Right .006 
(.071) 
-.177*** 
(.053) 
-.021 
(.041) 
-.116*** 
(.042) 
Income -.080 
(.120) 
-.144 
(.091) 
.104* 
(.059) 
.020 
(.063) 
Union Member .716 
(.555) 
.227 
(.448) 
.093 
(.362) 
-.250 
(.395) 
University Educated -.053 
(.615) 
.125 
(.432) 
.237 
(.296) 
.149 
(.315) 
Women -.040 
(.352) 
-.142 
(.260) 
.651*** 
(.188) 
.397** 
(.197) 
Age -.013 
(.013) 
.004 
(.009) 
-.00004 
(.00654) 
.006 
(.007) 
Constant -1.172 
(.784) 
.317 
(.557) 
.108 
(.424) 
.582 
(.436) 
LR Chi-Square (df) 103.36 (28) 
Pseudo R
2
 .037 
n  975 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano). 
1 Unión por el Perú. 
2 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP).  
3 Indigenous here refers to Quechua, Aymara, and Amazonian respondents. 
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Table 6 Estimates of Party Preferences (2006) 
 
 UPP
1
  PNP
2
 Other Parties Would not Vote 
 
Mestizo
3
  -.531 
(.344) 
-.568** 
(.253) 
.216 
(.195) 
.081 
(.202) 
Left-Right .005 
(.071) 
-.178*** 
(.052) 
-.023 
(.040) 
-.118*** 
(.042) 
Income -.125 
(.118) 
-.199** 
(.089) 
.080 
(.058) 
-.002 
(.062) 
Union Member .821 
(.551) 
.353 
(.443) 
.157 
(.362) 
-.192 
(.394) 
University Educated -.028 
(.613) 
.164 
(.428) 
.242 
(.296) 
.156 
(.315) 
Women -.055 
(.351) 
-.166 
(.258) 
.640*** 
(.188) 
.385** 
(.197) 
Age -.014 
(.013) 
.002 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.007) 
.005 
(.007) 
Constant -.355 
(.732) 
1.260** 
(.516) 
.123 
(.413) 
.701* 
(.422) 
LR Chi-Square (df) 91.84 (28) 
Pseudo R
2
 .033 
n  975 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano). 
1 Unión por el Perú. 
2 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP).  
3 Mestizo refers to "Mulatto" category in the World Values Survey data. 
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1
 For a discussion of the importance of national-scale organizations in advancing indigenous 
politics in Peru, see García and Lucero (2004), García (2005, Chapter 1), and Pajuelo (2007, 
Chapter 3). 
2
 In Spanish, the wording was ―no puedo permitir que los indígenas no encuentren una respuesta 
al neoliberalismo‖ (Página 12, January 22, 2006). 
3
 Humala‘s PNP failed to register properly for the 2006 elections and made a last minute deal 
with UPP to pursue his presidential ambitions (Schmidt, 2007: 816). 
4
 An OLS regression predicting the World Values Survey‘s 10-point income scale (ranging from 
lowest to highest incomes) with dummy variables for each of the three indigenous identities 
yielded two-sided t-values of -9.08, -5.48, and -1.72 for Quechua, Aymara, and Amazonian 
respondents, respectively.  This demonstrates significant economic marginalization among 
indigenous Peruvians. 
5
 The World Values Survey question asks respondents, ―If there were a national election held 
tomorrow, for which party would you vote?‖  Those respondents initially answering ―don‘t 
know‖ were asked a follow-up question: ―Which party appeals to you most?‖ 
6
 We opted to include all respondents because a substantial number of respondents in each 
survey stated that they would not vote or would cast a blank ballot. While we think that there is 
something to be said for examining the social bases of the parties relative to the whole sample, 
others may not agree and insist upon examining the parties‘ supporters relative to actual voters 
only. Because this concern is merited, we reran the analyses with the restricted data set to check 
for robustness and found that these robustness checks did not substantially alter the results.  
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7
 To ensure that nonvoters did not distort the results, we also operationalized this variable as a 
multinomial response.  This did not affect the results. 
8
 All indigenous categories are more likely to vote for the expected parties, though only Quechua 
are significantly more likely. This is due to the small number of respondents in the Aymara and 
Amazonian categories and multicollinearity problems with the other independent variables in the 
model. 
9
 In the 1996 World Values Survey, this was listed as ―Mestizaje Andino.‖  This changed to 
―Mestizo Andino‖ in 2001 and ―mulatto‖ in 2006.  
10
 These results are robust to the addition of other variables.  While variables measuring 
occupation were not available, adding additional control variables for lower levels of education 
did not alter the results.  Additionally, controlling for those regions in which support for Humala 
was strongest produced the same pattern of results. 
11
 The upper bound of the predicted probability confidence interval for Mestizo males is .129, 
while the lower bound is .149 for indigenous males. 
12
 ―Encuesta de Ipsos Apoyo: Toledo 23%, Keiko 19% y Humala 17%,‖ El Comercio, March 20, 
2011.  Keiko Fujimori—daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori—also emerged as a 
front-runner.  
13
 ―Miguel Hilario: ‗Mercedes Aráoz y Castañeda me ofrecieron integrar sus planchas 
presidenciales,‘‖ El Comercio, December 24, 2010; ―Alberto Pizango será el candidato 
presidencial del Partido Fonavista del Perú,‖ El Comercio, December 16, 2010. 
